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"RISKY BUSINESS": EPA DECISION-MAKING IN
THE SCREENING OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS
Nuno M. Santos*
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of using biological organisms to bring out desired
agricultural characteristics stretches back for centuries;' these
traditional agricultural uses underlie the science of modern bio-
technology.2 However, advances in microbiology have only re-
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, RECOMBINANT DNA SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 13 (1986) (linking the
use of living organisms to modify products for human consumption
with the ancient Sumerian practice of using yeast to make alcohol in
the form of beer, a ritual that dates back to sometime before 3000
B.C.); see also EPA, Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23313, 23314 (1986) (hereinafter "EPA 1986 State-
ment of Policy"); David J. Earp, Comment, The Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Plants: Is Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr McGregor's Vegetable Patch? 24
ENVTL. L. 1633, 1635 n.2 (1994) (describing the Office of Technology
Assessment's definition of biotechnology as "encompass [ing] traditional
practices such as brewing, baking, and animal husbandry.").
However, for an interesting refutation of this analogy, see Michael
Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y TIMES MAG., Oct. 25, 1998, at 48.
This author points out that the process of genetically engineering agri-
culture is different from traditional processes like fermentation:
"[G]enetic engineering overthrows the old rules governing the rela-
tionship of nature and culture in a plant. For the first time, breeders
can bring qualities from anywhere in nature into the genome of a
plant .... ." Id.
2. The United States Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA")
has defined biotechnology as, "any technique that uses living organisms
(or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants
or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses." U.S. CON-
GRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY:
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cently enabled humans to manipulate the inherited characteris-
tics of microorganisms, plants, and animals.3 Such technological
advances gave birth in the 1980s to the biotechnology industry, a
new member of the private sector that aimed at expanding and
commercializing the applications of genetic manipulation.4
Modern genetically engineered agricultural products have nu-
merous and far-reaching applications.' Successful exploitation of
these applications may translate into enormous potential profits.
For example, in 1992 the biotechnology industry as a whole ex-
perienced ten billion dollars in product sales and revenue. 6 To-
day, a mere six years later, one biotechnology company alone
AN INTERNATIONAL ANALSIS, OTA-BA-218, 3 (January 1984).
3. See EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23314. For an
excellent history of the persons & processes behind this scientific ex-
plosion, see SHELDON KRIMSKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF
THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY (1982).
In general, deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") contains the genetic in-
formation of all living things. See Leonard A. Post, Laying the Ground-
work: The Techniques and Applications of Recombinant DNA Technol-
ogy, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS USED IN THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 3-4.
Modern techniques of genetic manipulation focus on recombinant
DNA ("rDNA") technology, whereby a target piece of genetic informa-
tion encoded in DNA is identified, isolated and manipulated, resulting
in the end product known as rDNA. See id.
4. See, e.g., Earp, supra note 1, at 1635; Ruth E. Harlow, Note, The
EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95
YALE L.J 553, 553 (1986).
5. See Earp, supra note 1, at 1635 ("Companies make biotechno-
logical products for a wide range of applications, including healthcare,
agriculture, and bioremediation."); see also OECD, supra note 1, at 16-23
(describing a vast array of potential biotechnological uses).
A sample of agricultural and environmental uses would include:
transforming various plant species to attain "resistance to particular
herbicides, resistance to viruses and insects, improved fruit ripening
characteristics such as delayed spoilage, and improved nutritional
value ...... Earp, supra note 1, at 1636, and using microorganisms "to
degrade toxic pollutants . . .produce industrial chemicals, and act as
pesticides." EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, 51 Fed. Reg. at
4.
6. Earp, supra note 1, at 1635 n.3 (citing Ernst & Young's Eighth
Annual Report on the Biotechnology Industry).
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has reported revenues of seven and a half billion dollars.7
However, the risk of introducing genetically manipulated agri-
culture into the environment remains dangerously uncertain.'
One major concern is that microorganisms may have the poten-
tial to reproduce and spread when released into the environ-
ment, as opposed to traditional chemicals, which usually tend to
dissipate.9 As one commentator has noted: "[u]nless the scope
and conditions of initial releases of genetically engineered micro-
organisms are carefully limited, they can upset delicate ecological
balances."' 0 These risks could present disastrous results, and it is
the responsibility of environmental regulators to guard against
,them."1
7. See Bob Van Voris, In-House Counsel: . William Ide III, Monsanto
Corp., NAT'L LJ., Nov. 2, 1998, at BL.
8. See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 1, at 49 ("Uncertainty is the theme
that unifies much of the criticism leveled against biotech agriculture by
scientists and environmentalists.").
9. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Federal Regulation of Agricultural Biotech-
nologies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1089, 1093-94 (1987); see also OCED,
supra note 1, at 28.
10. McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1094. The natural
ecological balance can be disrupted in a variety of specific ways: ". .. (i)
direct but unanticipated effects of modified organisms on non-target
species; (ii) effects on the outcome of direct interactions among spe-
cies; (iii) alteration of indirect relationships between species; (iv) influ-
ences on the biochemical processes that support all ecosystems; and (v)
changes in the rate and direction of the evolutionary responses of spe-
cies to each other and to their physical and chemical environments."
OECD, supra note 1, at 29.
Furthermore, these risks are not merely speculative. In one of the
first genetically engineered microbial pesticide experiments, a bacte-
rium that lived on the roots of crop plants was engineered to secrete a
chemical to kill cutworms. However, it soon became apparent that the
bacterium applied its pesticide continuously, regardless of whether the
target insects are present in the field or not. This experience demon-
strates the potential for real harm, not only in terms of the overall
ecosystem but also in terms of increasing resistance to the pesticide in
the target insect population, which, because of constant exposure, may
very well incur a higher threshold of resistance (if not immunity) to
the pesticide. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9 at 1094.
11. See Pollan, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting a biotechnology execu-
tive as assuring that the government regulatory agencies are responsi-
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The EPA has attempted to address these concerns by revising
regulations to determine the safety level of a manufacturer's ex-
perimental testing of new bioagricultural products. 12 These
"screening" regulations administer the EPA's first contact with a
genetically engineered microbial product. 13 It is at this initial
stage of contact that the EPA determines the safety level of the
genetically engineered microbial product, a preliminary decision
that will likely influence further regulation of that product. 4 The
EPA's decision-making process involves two crucial steps: first, the
EPA must gather all relevant information on the particular prod-
uct to be regulated ("information acquisition"); second, the EPA
must assess the information received so as to proceed to a regu-
latory decision on that product. 15 Information plays a crucial role
in the EPA's screening of genetically engineered microbial
products.' 6
However, this neat and compact approach obscures a very
troubling reality: it is uncertain whether the EPA is able to make
quality regulatory decisions in a risk-based industry like biotech-
nology.'7 Before delving into the EPA's capacity for legitimate de-
cision-making, this Note will provide a brief historical back-
ble for product safety).
12. See infra Section I.C.1 and I.C.2.
13. See id.
14. For example, under TSCA, once a specific chemical substance
is deemed to satisfy the regulatory safety requirements, it may eventu-
ally be exempted from any further regulatory interference by being
listed on the TSCA Inventory. See Microbial Products of Biotechnology;
Final Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act; 62 Fed. Reg.
17910, 17911 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 700, 720, 721,
723, and 725) (hereinafter "TSCA Final Rule"); see also infta Section
I.C.2.
15. See infra Section II. It is important to note that information ac-
quisition and information assessment are only two steps in the regula-
tory maze. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Informa-
tion, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 U. COLO. L. REv
261 (1991). I have decided to restrict this analysis to these two regula-
tory steps.
16. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 261 ("Information re-
mains the sine qua non of the rational development of specific regula-
tory commands regarding hazardous chemicals.").
17. See infra Section III.
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ground as context for where we are today. Part I will analyze the
historical relationship between federal regulatory agencies and
what has become known as the biotechnology industry. 8 Part I
will then look at what some early commentators suggested as an
ideal regulatory scheme for biotechnology 19 followed by a brief
synopsis of the contemporary EPA regulatory scheme.20 Part II of
this Note will critically analyze the capacity of this regulatory
scheme to produce legitimate decisions, and maintain that the
majority of commentators who have critiqued the EPA's informa-
tion acquisition strategies have fallen short of laying out in an
explicit fashion the very real potential of industry concealment
of unfavorable information.21 Part II will also argue that the lack
of any meaningful public participation in the regulation process
also hampers the quality of information that the EPA may ulti-
mately acquire. 22 Finally, Part II will question whether the EPA
can properly make regulatory decisions based on the information
acquired. 23 The general framework used for such decisions is
known as "risk assessment" 24 and is itself a highly controversial
tool for decision-making. 25 Part III will present a possible alterna-
tive to correct this regulatory quagmire. When one examines risk
assessment in conjunction with the problems of information ac-
quisition, it becomes apparent that the EPA should make it im-
perative to publicize the assessment strategies it uses to deter-
mine a genetically engineered microbial product's safety at the
product's initial screening.26 By opening the process up to com-
mentary, such a strategy would go a long way toward alleviating
these problems.21
18. See infta Section I.A.
19. See infra Section I.B.
20. See infra Section I.C.
21. See infra Section II.A.1.
22. See infra Section II.A.2.
23. See infra Section II.B.
24. See infra Section II.B.2.
25. See id.
26. See infra Section III.
27. See id.
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I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Before analyzing the precise nature of the EPA's decision-
making strategies, it is first necessary to step back and review the
biotechnology industry's relationship with the federal govern-
ment. This section will first examine the historical roots of gov-
ernment involvement in the biotechnology industry,28 as well as
one commentator's early suggestion for an ideal regulatory
scheme aimed at the then-burgeoning biotechnology industry.2 9
Second, it will turn to the actual regulatory regime as currently
in force in the EPA and will describe the recent EPA screening
regulations.30 Examining these regulations in light of the history
that preceded their development provides a concrete backdrop
for the regulatory information demands that will be critiqued
later on in this Note.31
A. Historical Background
Federal regulation of genetic manipulation technologies can
be traced back to 1974.32 At that time, rDNA techniques were
first being developed, and some scientists expressed concern that
then-existing laboratory research methods would not sufficiently
contain the results of laboratory experiments on genetically engi-
neered bacteria. 33 Scientists feared that should such containment
strategies fail, the genetically altered bacteria would then colo-
nize in humans or the environment, with possibly catastrophic
28. See id.
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. See infra Section I.C.
31. See infra Section II and III.
32. Various works treat the controversies surrounding the "birth"
of biotechnology in some detail. See, e.g., KRIMSKY, supra note 3, at 339
(1982); JOSEPH MONROE AND EDWARD J. WOODHOUSE, AVERTING CATASTRO-
PHE: STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING RISKY TECHNOLOGIES (1986); Raymond
A. Zilinskas and Burke K. Zimmerman, The Gene-Splicing Wars: Reflec-
tions on the Recombinant DNA Controversy (1986); Susan Wright, Mo-
lecular Biology or Molecular Politics ? The Production of Scientific Consensus on
the Hazards of Recombinant DNA Technology, 16 Soc. STUD. Sci. 593 (1986).
33. See E.J. Woodhouse and Patrick W. Hamlett, Decision Making
About Biotechnology: The Costs of Learning From Error, in The Social
Response to Environmental Risk: Policy Formulation in an Age of Un-
certainty 131, 138 (Daniel W. Bromley & Kathleen Segerson eds., 1992).
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consequences.3 4 While some scientists voluntarily canceled their
experiments, agreeing that a closer examination of the risks
should precede further experimentation, others continued with
their work.35 In 1974, a National Academy of Sciences committee
called for a moratorium on many types of rDNA experiments,
and all researchers in the field voluntarily complied.36 The Na-
tional Institute of Health later published formal guidelines, ban-
ning certain experiments and limiting permissible experiments
to those that would conform to specified containment methods.3 7
Such federal involvement in the initial research and develop-
ment stage of biotechnology led to the expectation of further
regulations to govern the biotechnology industry as it moved
into the commercialization stage in the early 1980s.38 However, it
was discovered that not only was there an absence of a single
statute on point to specifically cover the risks associated with bio-
technology, but the various federal agencies were unprepared to
apply their enabling statutes to biotechnology.3 9 The Reagan ad-
ministration formed an interagency working group, the Domestic
Policy Council Working Group on Biotechnology, and charged it
with drafting an overall federal framework for regulating
biotechnology.40
In 1986, the results were published by the Office of Science
and Technology Policy as the "Coordinated Framework for Regu-
lation of Biotechnology" 41 ("Coordinated Framework"). This doc-
ument emphasized that adequate regulation of biotechnology
would be achieved through the existing statutory authorities and
that no new legislation would be sought.42 In light of biotechnol-
ogy's diverse product developments, the Coordinated Framework
34. See id. at 138; see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the risks of biotechnology).
35. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 138.
36. See id. at 138.
37. See id.
38. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1100.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51
Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986).
42. See id. at 23302.
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divided regulatory authority among five federal agencies that
would regulate biotechnological products that fell under their
traditional field of regulation.43 In anticipation of the problems
such a divided regulatory system might produce, the Biotechnol-
ogy Science Coordinating Committee had already been estab-
lished to coordinate the policies of the various agencies wielding
regulatory authority over biotechnology products.4
This brief history of the biotechnology industry describes an
enterprise plagued by the perception of risk.45 The overwhelming
response to this perception of risk was careful and steady pro-
gress.46 Unfortunately, this original response has been trans-
formed into the current problematic regime.47 However, as the
current regulations were taking shape, commentators addressed
what would ideally be involved in the regulation of an area like
biotechnology.48 This section now turns to analyze those early
suggestions, which in the end will hopefully illuminate the
present.
B. The Ideal Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology
As the biotechnology industry came to prominence in the mid-
1980s, commentators had to address not only what an ideal regu-
latory framework for agricultural biotechnology would look like,
but also whether there should be any regulation of agricultural
biotechnology at all.49 Once the latter question had been affirma-
tively answered, commentators began to speculate on what such
43. See Earp, supra note 1, at 1640. These named agencies were the
Food and Drug Administration, the United States Department of Agri-
culture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institutes
of Health, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See
id.
44. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology:
Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee,
50 Fed. Reg. 47174 (1985).
45. See, e.g., McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1102.
46. See id.
47. See infra Section I.C.
48. See infra Section I.B.
49. See, e.g., McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1102.
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a regime would ultimately look like.5 0
These commentators agreed upon certain points, most of
which are present in the current regulatory regime in one form
or another.5 1 Among these points of agreement, commentators
stressed the need for some sort of pre-release notification as a
favorable method to initiate regulation.5 2 Gathering, evaluating,
and assessing the risks of relevant data would form a second
step.53 The next logical step presents a risk management proce-
dure, which adequately responds to the risks presented.5 4 Finally,
in a controversial area like biotechnology, the ideal regulatory re-
gime should provide for broad public participation in the deci-
sion-making process. 55
To varying extents, these ideal elements are all present in the
EPA's regulation of genetically engineered microbial products.5 6
However, it is important to emphasize that the elements are
present to "varying extents" - some more than others.5 7 The sug-
gestions of these early commentators have been adopted in ways
that may compromise the ultimate effectiveness of the EPA's in-
formation acquisition and its subsequent assessment.58
The current regulatory framework, as supplemented by recent
regulations, lays out the formal decision-making methodology.
This following section will briefly analyze the statutes and the rel-
evant regulations. This regulatory framework lays out the statu-
tory basis for the information demands of EPA decision-making.
50. See id.
51. See infra Section I.C.
52. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1102. Advance
notification gives an agency an opportunity to decide whether to exer-
cise its regulatory power, and thus allows the agency to play a pro-
active role in the exercise of that regulatory power. See id. at 1102-03.
53. See id. at 1103; see also infra Section II.A. and II.B.
54. See id. at 1106-08. The topic of risk response is beyond the
scope of this paper.
55. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1108.
56. See id. at 1109-42; see also Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engi-
neered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPA's Regulation of Biotech-
nology, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 257 (1996).
57. The lack of any meaningful public participation is one such
notable exception. See infra Section II.A.2.
58. See id.
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C. EPA Statutory Authority
The EPA reviews genetically engineered microbial products
primarily under two statutory authorities.5 9 In doing so, the EPA
looks to determine whether any health or environmental risks
are present.6
1. FIFRA
The EPA regulates the use of genetically manipulated pesti-
cides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA"). 61 FIFRA authorizes the EPA to regulate the test-
ing of new pesticides or new uses of existing pesticides.62 Tradi-
tionally, the EPA was concerned only with regulating large-scale
tests.63 Depending on the degree of risk present, the EPA would
then determine whether an Experimental Use Permit ("EUP")
was necessary. If an EUP was indeed necessary, the EPA would as-
sume oversight over the proposed testing.64 The EPA generally
presumed that small-scale tests would not require EUP
notification. 65
59. See EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23314.
60. See id.
61. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136 (y) (1976). The Act defines "pesticide" as:
"(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or
mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliator
or desiccant ...... 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1976). The broad scope of this
definition allows the EPA to regulate the use of both traditional chemi-
cal pesticides as well as biological pesticides (whether genetically engi-
neered or not). See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 56, at 264.
62. 7 U.S.C. § 136(c) (1976).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 172. Under this regulatory scheme, an individual
who intended to test either a new pesticide or a new use of an existing
pesticide on a terrestrial application covering a cumulative total of
more than ten acres of land or any aquatic application covering more
than one surface acre of water was required to notify the EPA prior to
initiating such testing. See id.
64. See Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifi-
cations, 59 Fed. Reg. 45600, 45600 (1994) (to be codified as amend-
ments to 40 C.F.R. 172) (hereinafter "FIFRA Final Rule").
65. See id. Small-scale tests were used to refer to testing on a terres-
trial application covering a cumulative total of less than ten acres of
land or any aquatic application covering less than one surface acre of
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However, as the application of genetically engineered micro-
bial pesticides grew, the EPA realized that small-scale testing of
such genetically engineered microbial pesticides would likely
pose "sufficiently different risk considerations from conventional
chemical pesticides. '66 The agency decided to modify the pre-
sumption that small-scale testing would be exempt from the EUP
reporting requirement. As per the final rule issued in 1994,67 the
EPA now requires that it be notified prior to small-scale testing
in the environment of certain genetically engineered microbial
pesticides in order to determine whether such testing should be
conducted under an EUP.61
In deciding whether to issue an EUP, the EPA considers
whether the proposed activity will cause any unreasonable ad-
verse affect on the environment. 69 To determine unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment, the EPA must consider both
humans and the natural environment, "taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the
use of any pesticide. '70 In conducting such an inquiry, the EPA
adopts a standard of unreasonable risk,7' and proceeds by balanc-
ing both the risks and benefits presented by use of the pesti-
cide.72 In order to determine whether the risk is in fact "unrea-
sonable," the EPA undertakes a risk assessment of the product at
issue. 73
The dynamics of the EPA's risk assessment inquiry and its im-
plications will be explored in depth later in this Note. In order
to complete the analysis of the formal agency regulatory mecha-
nism in biotechnology, this section now turns to the EPA's other
main enabling statute.
water was required to notify the EPA prior to initiating such testing. 40
C.F.R. § 172.
66. See 59 Fed. Reg. 45600, supra note 64, at 45600.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976).'
71. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 268.
72. See Angelo, supra note 56, at 265.
73. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 277.
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2. TSCA
Genetically-engineered microbial products may also be regu-
lated under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") as chem-
ical substances. 74 Under section 5 of TSCA, all new chemical sub-
stances are subject to a screening process known as
"premanufacture notification" ("PMN"). 75 Once the EPA receives
a PMN, the agency has ninety days to determine whether to reg-
ulate the product so as to prevent unreasonable risk or substan-
tial exposure. 76 If the agency does not act within those ninety
days, the product may be used as intended and will be listed on
the TSCA Inventory, which designates those substances that are
not "new."
77
As with the EUP provision of FIFRA, the EPA recently revised
the PMN process. as it applies to biotechnology.78 TSCA estab-
lished certain exemptions from the PMN requirement.79 In par-
ticular, substances manufactured in small quantities for research
and development were exempted in what came to be known as
the "small quantities" research exemption.80 This had the effect
of exempting nearly all research and development activities from
PMN reporting requirements.8
Prompted by concerns similar to those under FIFRA, the EPA
created a new PMN reporting process for biotechnology known
74. See Angelo, supra note 56, at 267. The Act defines chemical
substances as "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular mo-
lecular identity, including . . . any combination of such substances oc-
curring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occur-
ring in nature .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2602 (1994). The authority to regulate
genetically engineered microbial products under TSCA is justified by
the EPA under the rationale that "[o] rganisms, both naturally occur-
ring and genetically engineered, are made up of substances of particu-
lar identities that occur in nature, or occur in whole or part as a result
of a chemical reaction. Thus, organisms are chemical substances under
TSCA." Angelo, supra note 56, at 267.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1994).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1994).
77. See Angelo, supra note 56, at 268.
78. See TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h) (1994).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1994).
81. See Angelo, supra note 56, at 268.
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as Microbial Commercial Activity Notices ("MCANs").82 The EPA
reasoned that no amount of microorganisms released into the
environment should be considered a "small quantity" because of
the unique risks associated with microorganisms - namely, the
potential to multiply, spread, and become established in the en-
vironment.8 3 The EPA will regulate the product development
under an MCAN if the agency determines that an "unreasonable
risk to human health and the environment" is present.8 4 As with
the EUP, this inquiry adopts a standard of unreasonable risk85
that is determined according to the process of risk assessment.8 6
II. THE REALITY OF REGULATION
Having laid out the history of government involvement in
bioagriculture and the current regulatory framework for the
bioagriculture industry, Part III now critically analyzes how this
regulatory framework is acted out in the screening of new prod-
ucts. Both the EPA's information acquisition and information as-
sessment strategies stem from the regulatory framework. How-
ever, the deficiencies present in both information acquisition
and information assessment become especially glaring in light of
the historical government interaction with the industry as well as
the EPA rationale for updating the screening regulations.
The screening process serves an important function as the es-
sential initial contact in regulation.8 7 The decision of whether or
not to regulate is a powerful one and could set the tone for fu-
ture regulatory efforts of that same product.88 The legitimacy of
the regulatory outcome is in a certain way dependent upon the
quality of information available to the agency in making its deci-
sion.8 9 In analyzing the risk decision-making process of the EPA,
82. See TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14.
83. See EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23326-30.
84. TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14, at 17910. This will permit the
agency to maintain oversight into the proposed product development.
See id.
85. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 268.
86. See id. at 277.
87. See supra Section II.C.2.
88. See supra text accompanying note 14.
89. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 261-3.
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the following section will concentrate on the information acquisi-
tion and information assessment.90
A. Information Acquisition
1. The Regulated Entity
Both TSCA and FIFRA place the burden on the manufacturer
to notify the agency in the event of commencing potentially reg-
ulated activity.91 On the one hand, placing the burden of notifi-
cation on the manufacturer makes sense. Having the regulated
entity provide the necessary information to the EPA represents
an allocative efficiency of transaction costs - manufacturers may
develop this information more cheaply than the EPA since they
and their customers may be in a better position to bear the cost
of developing the necessary information. 92
On the other hand, having the regulated party provide the ini-
tial information that determines whether regulatory activity will
occur carries some very troubling undertones. While it is true
that the EPA reviews the data received in conjunction with its
own knowledge base, 93 the fact remains that the industry partici-
pant is the one providing the initial information. The industry
participant has an interest in seeing the product quickly available
on the market so a return can be made on the initial invest-
90. In reality, these two processes are not exclusive but are rather
more fluid, open-ended processes. However, for the sake of analysis,
this paper draws such a formalistic distinction.
91. Under the 1994 EUP regulations, any'party intending to initi-
ate a small-scale test in the environment using certain microbial pesti-
cides must notify the EPA so the agency may then determine whether
to oversee the testing under a EUP. See 59 Fed. Reg. 45600, 45600
(1994). Similarly, under the 1997 MCAN provisions, a manufacturer
must notify the EPA ninety days prior to commencing the manufacture
of a genetically engineered microbial, unless that genetically engi-
neered microbe has been specifically exempted from the reporting
process. See 67 Fed. Reg. 17910, 17911 (1997); see also 15 U.S.C. §
2601(b) (1) (1994).
92. Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 310.
93. See, e.g., Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 301-10 (identifying
information sources such as compilations of existing data, record-
keeping, monitoring, inspection, and the government's own research).
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ment.94 The EPA, however, is looking to such information for
possible oversight or even rejection of the proposed activity.95
These conflicting roles may open the door to a form of agency
capture:96 the regulated entity has great incentive to manipulate
the data submitted to the EPA in the hopes of an expedient and
favorable resolution to the screening of its product.97 While some
have commented on this dynamic, these commentators tend to
downplay the potential for abuse it creates.9 This paper, how-
ever, posits that the potential abuses of this adversarial dynamic
should not be glossed over so lightly.
Voluntary disclosure of information encourages the free flow
of information that may help the agency to meet its regulatory
demands more efficiently.99 However, the use of this self-disclosed
information in a regulatory context to then punish the person
who initially disclosed the information can cripple the free flow
of such information. 100 This dilemma is well illustrated by the
regulatory use of voluntary environmental self-audits.10' In es-
sence, an environmental audit allows an assessment of the actual
and potential environmental problems facing corporations. 12 A
94. See infra text accompanying notes 119-123.
95. See, e.g., FIFRA Final Rule, supra note 64, at 45601 (enumerat-
ing the possible EPA determinations at the conclusion of an EUP
review).
96. See Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture,
2 N.YU. ENVTL. LJ. 34, 49-52 (1993). The author explains that while
capture of the entire EPA is highly unlikely, capture of a discrete unit
within the agency may indeed occur. See id.
97. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 311.
98. See id. ("The conflict rarely results in outright concealment,
falsification, or deliberate misstatement of results (though this unfortu-
nately is not unknown).").
99. See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113.
101. The EPA has defined voluntary environmental self-audits as a
"systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environ-
mental requirements." EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,
51 Fed. Reg. 25004, 25006 (1986).
102. See Annette T. Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the
"Good Samaritan" Doctrine: Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 GA. L.
REv. 223, 227 (1993).
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company that voluntarily discloses any such environmental
problems may attain significant penalty reductions.0 3
The voluntary disclosure of such highly unfavorable informa-
tion has certain virtues. 1°4 Voluntarily disclosed violations may be
subsequently corrected through the corporation's own initiative,
making for a smoother resolution than if the violations were dis-
covered independently by the government. 105 Further, such prac-
tice builds favorable public relations as well as good relationships
with the regulatory agency and instills a sense of accountability
within the corporation. 10 6 Finally, this practice informs the EPA
of compliance trends - knowledge the agency can use in later
regulatory development.07
In effect, the agency relies on the voluntarily disclosed infor-
mation to further its goal of ensuring compliance with environ-
mental standards without the need to incur the cost of site in-
spections and record searches. 08 However, the dynamics of this
information exchange present a real problem in that the EPA
uses the voluntarily disclosed information to proceed with an en-
forcement action against the corporation.' °9 In the worst case sce-
nario for the corporation, the environmental prosecutor may use
the company's own admission of violations in the audit as proof
of the requisite knowledge requirement for bringing a criminal
violation proceeding."0 By punishing the good-faith acts of vol-
103. See Krista McIntyre, Voluntary Disclosure: Gotcha, NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 52, 52 (Spr. 1997) (citing numerous such administrative and
judicial settlements in 1996).
104. See, e.g., EPA Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Viola-
tions, 60 Fed. Reg. 66706 (1995).
105. See McIntyre, supra note 103, at 53.
106. See id.
107. See id. Another virtue of the environmental self-audit protocol
is that the penalties imposed by such an audit present an easy revenue-
generating device for an agency that must normally depend on a
"fierce budgetary process or congressional approval." Somendu B.
Majumdar, Voluntary Environmental Compliance Auditing: A Primer, 7
FoRD)HAM ENVTL L.J. 817, 827 (1996).
108. See Majumdar, supra note 107, at 827.
109. See McIntyre, supra note 103, at 53.
110. See Mark L. Manewitz et al., Environmental Audit Policy, 7 FoRD-
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untary disclosure with the potential of crushing liability, the EPA
may effectively be creating a disincentive to the free flow of in-
formation between the regulated community and the EPA.' As a
result, the industry remains wary of undertaking voluntary envi-
ronmental audits." 2 Environmental enforcement suffers unless
the agency undertakes its own costly enforcement proceedings.
This example illustrates the tension between competing inter-
ests present when a regulated entity provides information of its
own accord to the regulating agency, information which the
agency may then use against the entity. The tension between
these competing interests may not only result in the disuse of a
valuable and efficient regulatory tool, but also, in the extreme,
such reliance on regulated entities for information instrumental
in shaping regulatory efforts can lead to outright falsification of
data."13
Unfortunately, examples of such occurrences are widely pres-
ent. For example, asbestos industry insiders expressed surprise at
the public revelation of the toxic effects of asbestos exposure,
when, in fact, serious and widespread harm was suspected as
early as the 1930s.1 4 The controversy over the current tobacco
settlement proposal provides yet another example of regulatory
information concealment. As part of the proposed settlement,
the industry must disclose internal documents and health files
previously asserted to be confidential." 5 Included in these inter-
HAM ENVTL. LJ. 775, 782 (1996). While the EPA has issued an interim
policy statement declaring that the agency will not use audit informa-
tion in making criminal referrals and will reduce penalties for corpora-
tions who voluntarily disclose and correct such violations, regulated en-
tities remain anxious that this is merely a policy statement and as such,
non-binding. See id. at 786-88.
111. See McIntyre, supra note 103, at 53.
112. See Majumdar, supra note 107, at 845.
113. "So many examples of financially motivated bias exist that the
motives and work of industrial scientists and consultants are inevitably
distrusted." Richard Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: The Need
for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (1980).
114. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law & Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG.
137, 150 (1995).
115. See Tobacco Settlement Document, Appendix VIII, at 64, avail-
able at <http://tobaccofreekids.org/html/page-12.html> (visited on
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nal documents are discussions of the manipulations of nico-
tine, 116 which is believed to confirm that the industry fostered
cigarette addiction. 117
These illustrations are directly relevant to bioagricultural in-
dustry. Biotechnology as a whole is one of the most highly profit-
able industries today." 8 Such high profits in the face of rapid
technological change have given rise to a highly competitive mar-
ketplace. Financial predictions have announced that,
"[c]ompanies that are able to accelerate the product develop-
ment process and reduce time-to-market will realize earlier reve-
nues and a faster return on R[esearch]&D[evelopment] invest-
ment."119 The rapid commercialization of biotechnology is
moving ahead with few calls for caution and restraint. 20 While
the emphasis on entering the market with the most lead-time
drives considerations of profitability of a new product, it also en-
courages "efficacy research and discourages attention to product
March 26, 1998). Such disclosure will still be subject to privilege and
trade secret protection, to be reviewed by the Attorney General. See id.
Note: This paper was finalized prior to the recent demise of tobacco
legislation. It remains unclear what effect, if any, that demise will have
on the settlement.
116. See Richard Sloane, "Details of the Tobacco Industry Settle-
ment," N.YL.J. August 19, 1997 at 4.
117. See American Cancer Society, Official Position on the Tobacco
Settlement, available at <http://www.cancer.org/advocacy/tobaccoposi-
tion.html> (visited on March 29, 1998).
118. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, Breeding Seeds of Discontent: Cotton
Growers Say Strain Cuts Yields, November 19, 1997, N.Y TIMES Dl, D5
(describing Monsanto, a company involved in bioagriculture as valued
at nine billion dollars).
119. Mercer County Chamber of Commerce, Bio-Imaging Technolo-
gies: Re-engineering the Drug Development Process, 69 MERCER BUSINESS 14,
14 (1993).
120. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 140. In the mid-1980s, while
the Coordinated Framework was first to establish its regulatory process,
"several flagrant procedural violations occurred, including unautho-
rized field tests by Monsanto, by Genetic Sciences, and by a Montana
State University researcher who declared his deed to be 'an act of civil
disobedience.' " Id. at 141-42 (quoting Michael D. Lemonick, Montana's
State's Troublesome Elms, TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 14, 1987 at 67).
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safety and side effects."' 121 Research into side effects takes time
and may delay a product's market introduction, creating a strong
disincentive to study such effects. 122
These considerations carry important implications. Both the
MCAN and EUP regulations apply to the EPA's initial contact
with a new genetically engineered microbial product. The adver-
sarial dynamics of this screening process not only encourage the
withholding of information (as in the self-audit illustrations), but
because of the competitive, profit-driven characteristics of the
biotechnology industry, the process also maintains a very real po-
tential for outright concealment of health and safety data that
may stall a product's time to market.
2. Public Participation
The degree of public participation is another area of informa-
tion acquisition that presents problems in the screening of
bioagricultural products. Biotechnology regulation as a whole
should ideally embrace the broadest possible public participa-
tion, considering both the controversial nature of such work
123
and the public's lack of confidence in regulatory agencies. 124 The
mistakes encountered by the nuclear power industry illustrate
the importance of engaging public confidence in the face of a
high-risk technology.125 Due to a failure to engage the public in
121. See Lyndon, supra note 114, at 148.
122. See id. at 146.
123. See, e.g., MAE-WAN Ho, GENETIC ENGINEERING: DREAM OR
NIGHTMARE? (1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century: Playing Ecological
Roulette with Mother Nature's Designs, EARTH ACTION NETWORK, April 1998,
at 36; Melanie Payne, Genetic Fears, CHI. TRIB., April 29, 1998, at C7; Ge-
netic Warfare, THE ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 87; Genetic Issues to Heat
Up in Congress, THE BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, August 22, 1997 at 1; see
also V. Kerry Smith, Environmental Risk Perception and Valuation: Conven-
tional Versus Prospective Reference Theory in THE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO RISK-
POLICY FORMULATION IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 23 (Daniel W. Bromley
and Kathleen Segerson eds., 1992) (discussing how people formulate
perceptions about environmental risks).
124. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1108 (point-
ing to efforts in the early 1980s to dismantle the EPA and other health
and environmental agencies).
125. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 136; see also Charles L. El-
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early discussions about the nuclear power industry, those advo-
cating for nuclear power as an energy resource faced an over-
whelmingly negative public response. The public cried out, fear-
ing potentially catastrophic meltdowns. This backlash destroyed
the industry after a hundred billion dollars had already been in-
vested in large-scale nuclear power plants. 126 However, if the pub-
lic had been engaged at the industry's inception, perhaps alter-
native, more acceptable modes of operation could have been
devised, and the industry would continue to represent a viable
energy alternative today.127 Thus, while public participation can
be burdensome to regulatory agencies and possibly even delay
regulatory decision-making, it is crucial to engage the relevant
public at least during the initial development of a new technol-
ogy.128 Should the technology then develop uneventfully, the
public will focus its attention on other concerns, and delays
should not clog the regulatory process.129
Public involvement in agency regulation of new technologies
can therefore be described as a central element in creating an
"intelligent" regulatory mechanism. Public participation "opens
up the process of agency policy innovation to a broad range of
criticism, advice, and data;"'' 30 the decisions ultimately reached
tend to be more "intelligent" than those actions decided upon
after one-sided contemplation. However, to expect general public
comments in a highly technical area like biotechnology is unrea-
sonable; therefore, public interest groups are generally in the
best position to serve as proxies for the general public opinion
when technical, highly specialized material makes up the subject-
matter of agency regulation.13'
kins, Current Models of Risk Assessment used in Biotechnology Regula-
tion in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REGULATION OF GE-
NETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS USED IN THE ENVIRONMENT 11, 11-12
(1988).
126. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 136.
127. See id. (noting how policy-makers may have pushed more
strongly for the development of smaller (thus "safer") reactors).
128. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1108.
129. See id.
130. Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 482
F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
131. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Ad-
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"Intelligent" decision-making in the context of a risk-enterprise
can simply mean the reduction of potential error.13 2 Studies of
decision-making models have identified four elements that
greatly reduce those odds of unacceptably costly errors:
(1) Early, vigorous review from diverse points of view designed
to debate the goals, potential pitfalls, and strategies to be
pursued,
(2) Built-in flexibility to delay accumulation of technological
momentum and to make it feasible to alter directions in light
of experience,
(3) Initial precautions to guard against egregious errors during
the first several decades when a technological system is likely to
have the highest uncertainty, and the greatest potential for in-
advertent harm, and
(4) Active monitoring of feedback and other ways of accelerat-
ing learning from experience. 133
In each of these four elements of intelligent decision-making,
there is a continuous emphasis on the value of debate; 134 the
more informed the decision-making process is, the more intelli-
gent the ultimate decisions will be. 135
However, the reality of public participation in the screening
process is far from the ideal of contributing to informed and in-
telligent. decision-making. 136 The biotechnology industry devel-
oped from cautious and deliberate research and development
techniques, emphasizing debate and inquiry before actual test-
ing. 137 Yet, after little more than ten years of experience with bio-
ministrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 143 (1998).
132. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 136.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 136-38 (defining the two principal considerations as
the "intelligence of democracy" and flexibility):
135. "Large technological systems affect myriad people [sic] in di-
verse ways, and no small group of insiders will have sufficient insight
(or concern) to protect enough of the competing interests. If lack of
early debate allows a technology to evolve in ways that conflict with sig-
nificant social needs, correcting the imbalance at a later stage can be
very costly." Id. at 136.
136. This paper focuses only on the EUP and MCAN application
process. For a discussion of public participation in the registration pro-
cess, see McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 53-57.
137. See Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 141; see also supra Section
II.A.
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technology, the EPA seems to leave little room for public partici-
pation in the regulating and screening of genetically engineered
microbial products. 138 The emphasis on debate in the four ele-
ments of decision-making seems to have been cast away. Accord-
ing to the four elements of decision-making, this abandonment
indicates that the public has shifted its attention to other new in-
dustries, as if there were no longer any controversies in biotech-
nology.1 39 As the decision-making model asserts, public involve-
ment is crucial to initial developments in new technologies, but
once the industry develops quietly, public attention will most
likely be diverted. 14° However, facts to the contrary exist. For ex-
ample, public interest groups continue to petition the EPA
against what these groups find to be dangerous practices; 141 yet,
public participation in the screening of genetically engineered
microbial products remains practically non-existent. 42
Perhaps the lack of public involvement may be due to the stat-
utory directive itself.143 The EUP process of FIFRA presents a de-
gree of public participation that is of somewhat questionable
value. In its 1986 policy statement, the EPA noted the possibility
of public comment in the EUP process. 144 If the EPA were to de-
termine that an application may have "regional or national sig-
nificance" it would publish the receipt of such an application in
the Federal Register.145 However, this may actually yield very lim-
ited participatory value because manufacturers routinely claim
their health and safety data are trade secrets, thus shielding such
information from the public until the EPA has completed its de-
cision-making process. 46 As a result, the public normally does
not have much substantive information in the Federal Register
138. See infta notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Con-
cerning the Registration and Use of Genetically Engineered Plants Ex-
pressing Bacillus Thuringiensis Endotoxins, Greenpeace International v.
Browner, 11-15 (Sept. 16, 1997).
142. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
143. See Thomas 0. McGarity and Sidney Shapiro, The Trade Secret
Status of Health and Safety Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies,
93 HARv. L. REv. 837 (1980).
144. EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23323.
145. See id.
146. See McGarity, Trade Secret, supra note 143, at 837-38.
[Vol. X
1999] SCREENING OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 251
on which to comment. While the applicant may share such infor-
mation with the public voluntarily, the highly competitive, "rush-
to-market" biotechnology industry makes this scenario very un-
likely.147 Thus, public participation in the field-testing of pesti-
cides has been called "inadequate."1
48
Public participation is similarly lacking meaningful attributes
under TSCA. Under the traditional PMN reporting process, the
EPA not only gives public notice of each PMN it receives, it also
publishes a monthly list of all outstanding PMNs for which the
ninety-day response time has yet to expire. 149 Under this tradi-
tional practice, chemical manufacturers usually claim that virtu-
ally all the contents of their PMN are trade secrets.150 While the
EPA regularly attempts to describe allegedly confidential informa-
tion as generically as possible, it is difficult for the public to
know whether or not it should be concerned about a product.
5 1
Under the new MCAN regulations, the EPA expressed its inten-
tion to continue under a similar publishing process.15 2 The man-
ufacturer tells the EPA what information should be considered a
trade secret153 upon which the EPA publishes a generic informa-
tional narrative as provided by the manufacturer.5 4 Depending
147. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
148. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1139.
149. See id. at 1141 (citing 15 USC § 2604(d) (2), (3)).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. The EPA has stated:
All reviews of microorganisms will follow established adminis-
trative steps that are the same for all substances subject to
PMN review. First, within 5 days of receiving the PMN, EPA
will issue an announcement in the Federal Register describ-
ing the submission. The announcement will include informa-
tion on the identity of the new microorganism, the type of
use, occupational exposure, production volume, a summary
of test data submitted in the notice, and the submitter's
identity.
EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23327.
153. "[The published document] will have confidential business
information deleted according to the manufacturer's instructions, al-
though EPA will strongly encourage manufacturers to release as much
information as possible." Id.
154. "If the identity and use are claimed as confidential, the
Agency will include a generic description provided by the submitter."
Id.
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on the specific type of MCAN application being submitted, the
EPA may or may not require the manufacturer to substantiate
the claims of confidential business information that will not be
made available to the public.'55 While any member of the public
may submit comments during that ninety-day period,156 the de-
gree of public participation here is similarly inadequate. The
EPA optimistically points to past voluntary PMN submitters who
claimed very little information as confidential, 1 7 but it is doubt-
ful that such a practice can be expected to continue in the face
of the current competitive, "rush-to-market" drive of the biotech-
nology industry.
The reality of information acquisition presents problems that
remain present-in the EPA's assessment of that information. The
role of the regulated entity and the lack of public participation
raise concerns in an industry of risk such as bioagriculture. The
following section examines the process of information assessment
in EPA screening regulation for genetically engineered microbial
products.
B. Information Assessment
1. The "Unreasonable Risk" Standard
The regulated entity and the public at large represent only two
sources of information that the agency may use in making its de-
cision. The agency must then assess that information. For both
the MCAN and the EUP screening process, the EPA will under-
take a risk assessment and weigh the risks and benefits of a ge-
netically engineered microbial product's preliminary applica-
tion. 5 ' However, problems also exist at this stage of information
assessment.
Under TSCA and FIFRA, this inquiry proceeds along the "un-
reasonable risk" standard. 59 By delineating the threshold of un-
155. See TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14, at 17927-78 (no substanti-
ation requirement in TSCA Experimental Release Application, "TERA,"
an abbreviated reporting notice for individualized tests, see 1997 Final
Rule at 17912 (6), but substantiation required for most reporting
notices).
156. See McGarity, Federal Regulation, supra note 9, at 1141.
157. See TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14, at 17928.
158. See supra Section II.C.
159. See id.
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acceptable risk as "unreasonable,"' 160 the regulatory decision-
making assumes four characteristics. 161 In the first place, the reg-
ulatory agency is regulating risk, not harm.162 The regulation of
harm attempts to address a definite, identifiable damage that has
occurred,63 but the decision-making process based on risk is, in
contrast, a much more open-ended process. 64 Second, the regu-
latory agency is not looking to determine absolute safety; instead,
the agency seeks to determine an acceptable level of "greater-
than-zero risk." 65 Third, risk regulation based on a level of un-
reasonable risk incorporates a "cost" inquiry to determine the ac-
ceptable non-zero level of risk.' 66 Finally, unreasonable risk deter-
160. " 'Unreasonable' describes an undefined, nonzero level of
risk determined on an ad hoc basis by balancing both health consider-
ations and nonhealth concerns such as technology, feasibility and cost."
Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 268.
161. See id. at 270; see also Hon. Stephen F. Williams, Keynote Ad-
dress in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REGULATION OF GE-
NETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS USED IN THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1988)
(exploring the nature of unreasonable risk decision-making in a
thought-provoking, yet conversational manner).
162. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 271.
163. See id. at 272.
164. See id. at 273. This characteristic of risk decision-making is
one of the main reasons so many commentators have taken issue with
risk assessment. See infra Section III.B.2.
165. Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 274. Eliminating all risk
from daily activities is virtually impossible. See Kathleen Segerson, The
Policy Response to Risk and Risk Perceptions, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO
RISK: POLICY FORMULATION IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 101, 101 (Daniel
W. Bromley and Kathleen Segerson eds., 1992) ("Virtually every human
activity involves a certain amount of risk,,from walking downstairs and
crossing the street and eating and breathing. Thus, the goal of a risk-
free environment is meaningless, unless individuals are willing to cease
all activity."). The question then becomes, how much risk should we al-
low? See Hon. Stephen F. Williams, Keynote Address, supra note 161, at
1.
166. Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 274-6. In determining ac-
ceptable levels of risks, the question of costs to be incurred (both on
the level of potential hazard to human health and in incurring indus-
try compliance) is an important factor that the agency must address.
See, e.g., Hon. Stephen F. Williams, Keynote Address, supra note 161;
Lester Lave, Benefits-Costs Analysis: Do Benefits Exceed Costs? in RISK, COST
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mination is invariably an ad hoc decision-making process,
allowing flexibility and a wide range of different factors to come
into the decision-making process. 167 Ad hoc decision-making can
also be seen as increasing the arbitrariness of an already open-
ended process.1 6
These four characteristics of determining risk on an unreason-
able basis form the background for the information demands of
the regulatory regime. 169 Since decision-making about unreasona-
ble risk relies primarily on information, 170 the legitimacy of the
agency's decision-making depends in a large part on how the
agency chooses to gather, develop, and analyze that information.
2. Agency Decision-Making and Risk: Risk Assessment
In determining whether a product presents unreasonable risk,
the EPA will consult its own information knowledge base 171 and
conduct a risk assessment inquiry.1 72 Quantitative risk assessment
is the favored method by the EPA to measure the probable
health effects of a toxic substance. 173 This process seeks to calcu-
late risks that cannot be directly observed or measured by analyz-
ing all available toxicity and exposure data. This process, in the-
AND LIVEs SAVED (1996).
167. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 276-77.
168. See infra Section III.B.2.
169. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 271.
170. "Information remains the sine qua non of the rational devel-
opment of specific regulatory commands regarding hazardous chemi-
cals [under TSCA and FIFRA]." Id. at 261.
171. See id. at 301-06 (identifying compilations of existing data, re-
cord keeping, and government research as some illustration of the
agency's own information sources). These other sources of information
are outside the scope of this paper, which focuses in on how the
agency assesses information through the risk assessment process. For
commentary on how the agency develops its own scientific information,
see Sidney A. Shapiro, Resolving Technological Controversies in Regulatory
Agencies, 6 RisiL HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 127 (1995).
172. See EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23323 (stat-
ing risk assessment is used under FIFRA's EUP notification); see also
TSCA Final Rule, supra note 14, at 23328 (stating risk assessment is
used to evaluate the MCAN process).
173. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 277.
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ory, provides an objective evaluation of the risks posed by a
chemical. 174
It is believed that quantitative risk assessment is an analytical
tool that "fits hand in glove" with the four previously mentioned
characteristics of unreasonable risk decision-making.1 75 Just as the
unreasonable risk standard does not aim to measure the degree
of harm, quantitative risk assessment measures risk and not ac-
tual harm. 76 Moreover, along with the unreasonable risk stan-
dard, the use of quantitative risk assessment also implicitly as-
sumes that the mere presence of risk is not a sufficient reason to
prohibit the use of a regulated product. 7 7 Cost is also incorpo-
rated as an important factor; quantitative risk assessment pro-
vides the framework for the cost-risk-benefit analysis by providing
different numerical values as representative of the degree of risk
that can later be compared in the decision-making process. 78 Fi-
nally, quantitative risk assessment, like the unreasonable risk
standard, is a case-by-case analysis of risk determination that
takes into account the particular information available about a
specific product's characteristics, thus operating in an ad hoc
manner.
179
However, what sounds theoretically plausible does not always
translate well into practice. The use of quantitative risk assess-
ment as an analytical tool has been critiqued in a manner that
tends to follow one of two possible modes of argument: 'com-
mentators either strongly disapprove of the use of quantitative
risk assessment, or, in contrast, advocate a more moderate, cau-
174. See id. at 277-78. Risk assessment needs to be distinguished
from risk management. The former looks to scientifically determine
the degree of risk present, while the latter, by considering various polit-
ical and policy imperatives, looks to characterize and address the deter-
mined degree of risk present. See id. at 279.
175. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
176. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 279.
177. See id. at 279-80.
178. See id. at 280.
179. Id. ("Its conclusions are based on toxicity and exposure infor-
mation about particular chemicals, and it strives to achieve a level of
precision about risk greater than that which can be achieved by genera-
lized estimates. It is an alternative to generic or qualitative approaches
to risk regulation.") (emphasis in original).
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tionary implementation of quantitative risk assessment methodol-
ogies. 180 While the extreme position maintains that all determina-
tions arrived at through the quantitative risk assessment are
fatally flawed, the moderate position recognizes the need for un-
dertaking quantitative risk assessment inquiries and advocates
caution in the use of such strategies. Even though the EPA has
yet to make public the exact quantitative risk assessment strate-
gies it uses in screening genetically engineered microbial prod-
ucts, 18' it is valuable to analyze the controversy surrounding the
use of quantitative risk assessment in the EPA's carcinogenic reg-
ulations since this debate highlights the central issue in the use
of quantitative risk assessment strategies - namely, the problem of
subjectivity.
The process of quantitative risk assessment basically involves
four stages. 82 The first involves hazard identification, a qualita-
tive process that places the known risks present into certain cate-
gories based on available evidence.8 3 The second stage, dose-
response assessment, uses animal experiments to achieve certain
estimated results that predict likely dose-response at low-levels
over long periods of time. 184 The third stage, exposure assess-
ment, looks to estimate the likelihood that people may actually
come into contact with the toxic substance. 85 The fourth and fi-
nal stage, risk characterization, multiplies the dose-response re-
sult (the estimate of harm from incremental doses) by the expo-
sure assessment (the estimate of exposure that people are likely
to come into contact with); the resulting figure should represent
the threat to people present in the concentration of a chemical
that might actually reach those people. 186
In essence, the major criticism directed towards quantitative
risk assessment is the uncertainty that predominates the entire
180. See infra notes 203-220 and accompanying text.
181. See infra Section III.
182. For an thorough discussion of each stage, see Mark E. Shere,
The Myth of Meaningful Risk Assessment, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 430-
68 (1995).
183. See id. at 430.
184. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 278.
185. See Shere, supra note 182, at 430.
186. See id. at 430-31.
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process; at every stage, the process relies on subjective assump-
tions that are then stacked upon further assumptions. 18 7 Each as-
sumption by itself can skew the analysis somewhat, but when the
assumptions at each stage are taken together, the numerical re-
sult "generates numbers that are meaningless."' 8 8 According to
this extreme viewpoint, it is virtually impossible to justify quanti-
tative risk assessment; the typical justifications fail when analyzed
against the subjective uncertainty that permeates the entire quan-
titative risk assessment process. 8 9 For example, this viewpoint
takes issue with those who justify quantitative risk assessment as
an overly protective determination of risk. By contending that
even though the actual risk present may be much less than the
resulting risk assessment value, it is right for the agency to err on
the side of public health. 190 The extremist position responds that,
first, regulation that does not accurately reflect the actual risks
present is inefficient and may in effect decrease available spend-
ing for health costs by increasing regulatory costs. 191 Second, the
resulting data from animal studies may not accurately reflect
human effects. 192 Third, the argument of erring on the side of
public health still reflects certain assumptions and does not con-
sider other risks that may be present.193 Further justifications ar-
gue that standardizing the procedures would bring increased
consistency and objectivity. 94 This argument also misses the point
because, according to the extremist position, "the most that
'consistency' can accomplish is to produce numbers that are con-
187. See id. at 413-14.
188. See id. at 414.
189. See id. at 468 (the following discussion synthesizes many of
this commentator's more elaborate arguments).
190. See id. at 469-73.
191. See id.; see also Williams, supra note 161, at 2.
192. See Schere, supra note 182, at 470.
193. See id. at 470-71 (giving various examples such as when the
EPA assesses risks in the clean-up of hazardous industrial sites, it as-
sumes a risk present is that "children will eat dirt at the site each day"
but does not take into account the risks present for workers and the
public "from bringing in heavy machinery to excavate what may be
thousands of tons of soil.") (citations omitted).
194. See id. at 476-77.
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sistently meaningless because of their inherent uncertainty." 95 Fi-
nally, those justifications that argue for mere risk prioritizing 96
are criticized in the extremist argument for two reasons. First,
risk-prioritizing is an inherently qualitative process that can be
accomplished without the need of complicated, elaborate risk as-
sessment models; 97 second, priority-setting is itself a difficult po-
litical policy question that involves very subjective moral and ethi-
cal questions. 98 According to the extremist viewpoint,
quantitative risk assessment is indefensible as a regulatory device.
The problems presented by the EPA's use of quantitative risk
assessment in carcinogenic regulation are directly applicable to
the problems that quantitative risk assessment could present in
the EPA's biotechnology regulation. Carcinogenic toxicity is a,
process that is not well understood - uncertainty about actual
causation as a result of exposure results in uncertainty in deter-
mining completely safe threshold levels of carcinogenic expo-
sure.1 99 Similarly, the risks presented by a genetically altered
product that is released into the environment is just as uncer-
tain.200 Thus, some have criticized the use of quantitative risk as-
sessment as a methodology in genetically engineered microbial
product regulation as continuing to rely on subjective, uncertain
policy determinations that are not objectively scientific. 20 1
195. See id. at 476 (citation omitted).
196. See id. at 477.
197. See id. at 478.
198. See id. at 478-79. This commentator gives an example that
helps to clarify the point:
Suppose that site A is an abandoned dump that poses rela-
tively serious risks, but is difficult to make substantially
cleaner; this situation may occur if chemicals descended
through the soil at a site and settled into fractures in the
bedrock, where they act as a continuing source of ground-
water contamination. Suppose that other sites, B and C, pose
relatively lower risks, but these sites are relatively easy to
clean because the contamination lies on the soil surface.
Which of the sites should receive top priority?
199. See Applegate, supra note 15, at 264-66.
200. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 4, at 560-63.
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However, other commentators have posed a counter-argument.
These commentators maintain that it is possible to assume a
moderate stand on the use of quantitative risk assessment as a
whole. While one cannot deny the uncertainty presented by the
various subjective assumptions made in quantitative risk assess-
ment process, it is useful to return to the advocacy of quantita-
tive risk assessment as a priority-setting device. This moderate po-
sition agrees with the view that while it is wrong to base
regulatory decisions solely on the basis of quantitative risk assess-
ment, there is a place for quantitative risk assessment as another
factor the agency considers in its decision-making as a whole.
20 2
This viewpoint acknowledges that while quantitative risk assess-
ment is of limited objectively scientific value, 20 3 it can nonetheless
be a powerful tool for prioritizing already-existing risks.
2°4
Quantitative risk assessment thus can be placed in perspective
as a governmental indicator, which like other common economic
indicators, are not presented as absolutely true, but allow for pri-
ority-setting to take place and provide the basis for informed de-
bate. 205 Governmental indicators are especially of value for two
reasons. First, indicators serve a useful function in planning the
best possible course of action to take. 206 In this respect, the prob-
202. See Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of
Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643
(1995); Carl F. Cranor, The Normative of Risk Assessment, 8 RsIsK HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT 123 (1997); Bernard Goldstein, Risk Assessment
as an Indicator for Decision Making in RISK, COST, AND LIvES SAVED 67
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
203. See Goldstein, supra note 202, at 80.
204. See id. at 69.
205. See id. at 67 (analogizing quantitative risk assessment as a pol-
icy tool similar to "the unemployment level or the gross domestic
product").
206. See id. at 70:
For example, money market managers and individual inves-
tors pay close attention to any of the indicators that might
affect how the Federal Reserve will adjust interest rates, mul-
tinational corporations ponder the effect of international
trade figures on governmental policy, and businessmen and
investors are well aware that figures reflecting unemployment
and domestic product are good indicators of whether Con-
gress might be resorting to pump-priming measures.
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lem of uncertainty in quantitative risk assessment becomes mini-
mized as indicators are not taken to be expressions of scientific
certainty.2017 Second, the question of standardization becomes
refocused, since another value of indicators is that they rely on
general guidelines to indicate freedom from partisan political
bias.20 1 One knows, for example, that unemployment indicators
should not mysteriously fall just before a presidential re-
election.20 9 Similarly, by standardizing quantitative risk assessment
guidelines, the regulatory process assumes a greater legitimacy.210
Even though standardization raises the tension between adopting
more flexible guidelines that are more easily adaptable to tech-
nological change as between more rigid guidelines that afford
regulatory certainty,211 the public debate that results from the
proposal to adopt certain guidelines would, in the very least, ad-
dress this tension. While it may not be fully resolved, debate
should allow for the adoption of reasonably informed guidelines
that take this tension into account.
However, this analogy should not be taken lightly. Certain im-
portant distinctions do exist between the use of quantitative risk
assessment as a governmental indicator and other more common
indicators already in use. In the first place, quantitative risk as-
sessment attempts to count the uncountable - it extrapolates al-
ready-existing, readily observed data to designate a likelihood of
some unobserved, as-yet-to-occur determination.2 12 Second, haz-
ard identification is an inherently contentious process and repre-
sents a qualitative process that cannot easily be quantified. 213 Fi-
nally, as opposed to the standard governmental indicators,
quantitative risk assessment helps to bridge the gap between
207. See id. at 71-73, 80.
208. See id. at 70-71.
209. See id. at 69.
210. See id. at 71 (mentioning the attempt to standardize carcino-
genic quantitative risk assessment guidelines so as to do away with the
argument of inefficient regulatory complexity by the various agencies
involved in carcinogenic regulation all have different quantitative risk
assessment methodologies).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 74-75.
213. See id. at 75-76.
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available scientific knowledge and current regulatory needs to
provide better decision-making. Quantitative risk assessment pro-
vides its own impetus for the research needed to improve the
process of risk assessment.214
Quantitative risk assessment is a valuable tool if its inherent
limitations are recognized. One of the most important of these
limitations is that quantitative risk assessment is best suited for
setting priorities where the harm has already occurred and the
risk is readily observable, rather than the prevention of risks that
have yet to occur.215 The use of risk assessment in screening pro-
cedures presents a problem, especially if the data end product of
a screening risk assessment is taken as an accurate scientific de-
termination. 216 Furthermore, a question exists about the quality
of data available within the agency to assess the product at its
screening phase.217 On one hand, screening relies on possibly
outdated scientific information in the agency's own archives. 218
On the other hand, the screening process typically evaluates a
product in its pre-market phase, when the least is known about
the product's long-term effects.
219
Nevertheless, screening is a necessary and important step in
the regulation of a risk-based industry. The determination of risk
necessary before a product is released into the environment and
the screening of a product may set the tone for further regula-
tion of that product since the screening stage represents the
agency's first contact with the product to be regulated. 220 The
tension between the necessity for screening a product's risk and
the uncertain determination of that risk can possibly be ad-
dressed by returning to risk assessment as an indicator to set pri-
214. See id. at 76-77. This commentator describes how the interplay
among scientists and regulators in the risk assessment process allows
scientists to know where certain scientific questions are lacking and
regulators to address situations where regulatory force is lacking.
215. See id. at 69 ("[P]olicy makers do not always recognize that
risk assessment is far better as a means to set priorities for situations in
which pollution has already occurred that it is for prevention.").
216. See id.'
217. See Applegate, supra note 15, at 310.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See supra note 14.
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orities. If, as the moderate position on the use of risk assessment
maintains, risk assessment should not be the sole criterion for
decision-making but should be one element in decision-making,
one could argue that the EPA may be proceeding on the right
track. The agency has stated that both the EUP and MCAN re-
view are not limited to risk assessment, but can also involve re-
view and commentary from other Federal agencies as well as
outside expert consultants. 221 Such an extended consultation pro-
cess would be of especially great importance in screening new
genetically engineered microbial products that the agency had
not yet confronted. The extended consultation process would as-
sure that the uncertain risk assessment results were but one fac-
tor in the review process. Such a review process is already pro-
vided for in the regulatory procedure since both the EUP and
MCAN screening processes allow for the possibility of extending
the limited review period.222
Unfortunately, the agency has not set forth any public guide-
lines on conducting risk assessment of genetically engineered mi-
crobial products. This is the most serious critique that can be lev-
ied against the current regulatory screening procedure.
1II. THE REAL RISK THE LACK OF PUBLIC RISK ASSESSMENT
GUIDELINES
As this Note has set forth, the quality of decision-making is di-
rectly related to the quality of information received - the most le-
gitimate and intelligent decision-making process would greatly re-
duce the possibility of error by incorporating a process of debate
within that decision-making.223 However, in the screening of ge-
221. See EPA 1986 Statement of Policy, supra note 1, at 23323
(commenting on the EUP process); see also id. at 23328 (commenting
on the MCAN process).
222. Both the EUP and MCAN review process allow for an exten-
sion of the length of the agency's review where it determines that fur-
ther information may be needed to come to an accurate determination
of unreasonable risk presented by the application. See EPA 1986 State-
ment of Policy, supra note 1, at 23323 (commenting on the EUP pro-
cess); see id. at 23328 (commenting on the MCAN process).
223. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text. It should be
emphasized, however, that the thrust of this paper's argument looks to
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netically altered products, both the information and the deci-
sion-making process present problems serious enough to warrant
questioning the legitimacy of risk decision-making.
On first impression, it would seem that the EPA would be ex-
tremely sensitive to these concerns, having recently revised its
screening regulations to account for greater safety. 224 But
problems still abound. The information that the agency receives
from biotechnology industry participants may very well conceal
adverse health and safety data. The federal statutes provide little
relief since published notices available for public comment are
of dubious legitimacy when censored by the industry participant.
The information available may be of questionable merit.
Moreover, the decision-making process may itself be seriously
flawed. The agency acknowledges that it evaluates health and
safety data by performing quantitative risk assessment. However,
if risk assessment is to provide the most accurate conclusion pos-
sible, it must not be the sole determinant in the decision-making
process. This Note has shown that risk assessment is most effec-
tive when used only as an indicator for decision-making. The
agency cannot base its decisions solely on risk assessment results;
it must also look to other sources of information, such as outside
scientists and other Federal agencies. However, by not publishing
any standard statement of how the risks are assessed, the agency
does a disservice to the regulated community, and to the public,
and to the legitimacy of the regulation itself. The biotechnology
community is left with uncertainty as to which factors to take
into consideration when designing a new genetically engineered
microbial product. The public is left in the dark, in the face of
the still-current perception of biotechnology as having the poten-
tial for nightmarish consequences. Finally, the agency is hurting
the legitimacy of its own regulations. Making its risk assessment
debate as a valuable tool in creating intelligent decision-making meth-
odologies. This is not to say that the only way intelligent decisions can
ever be made is through debate. Rather, once an intelligent decision-
making methodology is in place, the actual decisions arrived at
through the use of such a methodology should be as intelligent as' the
debate surrounding the creation of such a decision-making
methodology.
224. See supra Sections I.C.1. and I.C.2.
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criteria public opens the screening process up to public debate,
opening the door to more intelligent decision-making. 2 5
This controversy recently came to light when the EPA re-
sponded to criticism that it does not have a formal risk assess-
ment process for genetically engineered microbial products. 26
The agency described that after more than ten years of experi-
ence in reviewing genetically engineered microbial products, its
risk assessment methods are not only consistent but have also
been peer reviewed.2 27 Further, a group of outside academics re-
viewed "major assessments" of genetically engineered products
released into the environment. 21 "These intra-agency laurels run
directly contrary to the comments of an anonymous EPA risk as-
sessment official who revealed that the agency remains ignorant
even of what questions to ask in assessing risks presented by ge-
netically engineered microbial products. '229
This apparent contradiction is most troubling; while the
agency's response and the anonymous source seem entirely con-
tradictory on the surface, a deeper confirmation can be seen. In
the first place, the agency's own response implicitly states that in
screening genetically engineered microbial products, risk assess-
ment remains the primary tool for decision-making. This is evi-
dent in the agency's acknowledgment that the procedure itself
has been reviewed, and only those applications the agency calls
"major assessments" have themselves been reviewed by outside
experts. Second, the agency response does not deny the lack of a
standard risk assessment protocol. In fact, the agency is quite up-
front about this deficiency: a senior microbiologist in the Office
of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances ("OPPTS") stated
"in terms of a formal document, we don't have one."230 This offi-
cial defended the validity of EPA risk assessment on other
225. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
226. See Bert McMeen, Biotechnology: EPA Program Stirs Controversy
Over Adequacy of Risk Assessment Method, BNA CHEM. REG., D at d8, Sept.
2, 1997, available in Westlaw, CHRD d8.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (statement of Philip G. Sayre, a senior microbiologist in
the EPA Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances).
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grounds as well. He mentioned that the risk assessment protocol
was indeed publicly informed since the public had access to in-
termittent workshops on those risk assessment protocols. 3 1 How-
ever, intermittent workshops are no substitute for the focused
public commentary received when proposing standardized guide-
lines. The lack of any formal documented guidelines cheapens
the legitimacy of such workshop participation.
Furthermore, the OPPTS official stated that what the EPA ex-
amines in conducting risk assessments is published in the screen-
ing final rules.232 However, a review of both the final rules fails to
reveal any such description of risk assessment procedure. 233 The
official also went on to point to the Proposed Guidelines for
Ecological Risk Assessment23 4 as a formal document that "mir-
rors" the overall risk assessment procedure currently in use.
235
The proposed guidelines have since been made final.
236
Several criticisms can be levied against this attempted defense.
In 'the first place, scientists have criticized the EPA's attempt to
address the broad science of ecology in a single set of guide-
lines. 237 The EPA seemed to respond to this criticism in the final
guidelines in its assertion that the guidelines are broad in scope
and describe general principles. 238 The EPA intends to follow the
broad guidelines "with a series of shorter, more detailed docu-
ments that address specific ecological risk assessment topics."
23 9
The EPA believes this approach to risk assessment will provide
231. See id. (mentioning three workshops held in 1992, 1993, and
1996).
232. See McMeen, supra note 226 (referring to the TSCA experi-
mental release applications, abbreviated "MCANS").
233. See FIFRA Final Rule, supra note 64; see also TSCA Final Rule,
supra note 14.
234. See 61 Fed. Reg. 47552 (1996).
235. See McMeen, supra note 226.
236. See EPA, Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed.
Reg. 26846 (1998), replacing Framework for Ecological Risk Assessment,
EPA/630/R-92/001 (1992).
237. See Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News, Scientists Critique Eco-
logical Risk Assessment Guidelines, Dec. 13, 1995 (no page references avail-
able) (available on Westlaw as 1995 WL 12837058).
238. See Guidelines, supra note 236, at 26846.
239. Id.
266 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
the agency with the flexibility needed to address scientific and
technological change as it swiftly develops.240
While such a flexible approach is indeed laudable in its at-
tempt to keep pace with rampant scientific change, the question
remains unanswered: what sort of risk assessment protocol is the
EPA using in the screening of genetically engineered products?
What the OPPTS official describes as an illustrative document ac-
tually offers only vague approximations and ambiguities.2 4' The
Proposed Guidelines address this:
(The Proposed Guidelines] are broad in scope, describing gen-
eral principles and providing numerous examples to show how
ecological risk assessment can be applied to a wide range of sys-
tems, stressors, and biological/spatial/temporal scales .... Be-
cause of their broad scope, the Proposed Guidelines do not
provide detailed guidance in specific areas nor are they highly
prescriptive.2 42
The Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment describe only a
generalized protocol in the most all-inclusive of terms. The EPA's
risk assessment methodology, if there is one, remains a
mystery.243
This question is of central importance as genetically engi-
neered food products have already widely infiltrated the nation's
produce growers. 244 In the above context, the lack of agency can-
240. See id.
241. An argument about how these guidelines could be used as
the actual qualitative risk assessment methodology is not within the
scope of this paper, as the guidelines are drawn so broadly that count-
less alternative arguments for a single proposition could be spun. See
Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News, Scientists Critique Ecological Risk As-
sessment Guidelines, Dec. 13, 1995 (no page references available) (availa-
ble on Westlaw as 1995 WL 12837058) (comments of S.M. Bartell,
describing a draft of the regulation as such: "The current draft loses
the train of thought as the result of introducing a plethora of issues,
considerations, caveats, strengths and limitations.").
242. 61 Fed. Reg. 47552, 47552.
243. The Final Ecological Risk Guidelines retain this broad scope.
See Guidelines, supra note 236, at 26846. It is the EPA's intent to follow
these broad guidelines with more detailed regulations aimed at specific
areas. See id. In the meanwhile however, genetically engineered prod-
ucts continue to be screened.
244. For example, "[as of 1998], some 45 million acres of Ameri-
can farmland [has] been planted with biotech crops, most of it corn,
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dor about its risk assessment procedures is quite alarming. And
yet, the problems inherent in risk decision-making have been
recognized for some time. In 1977, the National Academy of Sci-
ences warned the EPA about relying on regulated industries for
data and analysis for its decision-making.2 45 In order to combat
the danger presented by reliance on such information, certain
remedial strategies were suggested, including the use of peer re-
view, review by other agencies, and stringent guidelines and pro-
tocols. 246 While the first two recommendations have been wisely
followed, the EPA seems to have fallen short on the last piece of
advice.
Proposals for designing risk assessment protocols in genetically
engineered microbial product regulation existed as early as
1986.247 The EPA, however, has yet to publish any such docu-
ment, and instead can only reference a hodge-podge of vague
protocols. In the end, everyone suffers: the regulated commu-
nity, the public, and the legitimacy of the agency's own determi-
nations. The goals of the screening process are highly susceptible
to the dangers of subjectivity. This is evidenced by the four char-
acteristics of risk regulation. First, screening looks to regulate the
degree of risk, not harm; one must ask what interests are consid-
ered in prioritizing these risks. Second, screening acknowledges
that the mere presence of risk is not a sufficient reason to pro-
hibit a product's use; one must ask what criteria are used to de-
termine the safety threshold before a product may be prohibited.
Third, screening incorporates the question of cost into the risk-
benefit analysis; one must ask what costs are considered unac-
ceptable. Finally, screening involves a case-by-case analysis; one
must ask to what degree this analysis remains uniform. The ques-
tion of uncertain subjectivity permeates all these aspects of
screening regulation.
If the screening process under TSCA and FIFRA is dangerously
susceptible to uncertainty,248 then the publishing of standardized
soybeans, cotton and potatoes that have been engineered to either pro-
duce their own pesticides or withstand herbicides." Pallon, supra note
1, at 45.
245. See 2 National Research Council/National Academy of Sci-
ences, Decision-Making in the Environmental Protection Agency 50-58.
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 1, at 24-40.
248. See supra Section II.B.
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risk assessment protocols may, in this case, provide a simple rem-
edy for the problem. Informed regulation makes for more intelli-
gent decision-making. By publishing a standardized risk assess-
ment protocol, all affected parties benefit in a net gain of
information. Industry gains standardized protocols that may be
looked to for clear guidance. The public not only achieves
greater participatory value, but also has an opportunity to influ-
ence the way decisions are made. The agency itself benefits both
from more efficient regulation (in the sense that clear guidelines
establish the possibility of more streamlined acceptance or prohi-
bition of a substance) and from more intelligent regulation (with
the opportunity to receive commentary from affected parties).
Moreover, this recommendation avoids the concern of clog-
ging the regulatory mechanism and creating a disincentive to in-
dustry.249 If, as the EPA maintains, its risk assessment methods are
already consistent and peer reviewed, then publishing such a
standardized document should not create any greater regulatory
hurdles. Rather, such a strategy will likely provide more debate,
both on the actual quantitative risk assessment methods used
and on whether or not quantitative risk assessment is the sole de-
terminant in its screening decisions. As one commentator has
suggested, "even if additional information will never eliminate
uncertainty, it can usefully reduce uncertainty and improve
agency decision-making." 250
CONCLUSION
Decision-making about risk is itself a risky enterprise. This
problem is highlighted in the screening of products using geneti-
cally engineered microbes. The information that the EPA uses
may be flawed on two separate levels. On the first level, the regu-
lated community has a very real incentive to conceal health and
safety data, due in a large part to the highly competitive nature
of biotechnology industry. Second, the screening process itself
does not allow for any real significant degree of meaningful pub-
lic participation. The information that the agency relies upon
may thus be seriously flawed and incomplete. Finally, when it
comes time for the agency to make its decision about the risk
249. See Elkins, supra note 125, at 12 (cautioning against the dan-
ger of over-regulation).
250. Applegate, Perils, supra note 15, at 266.
[Vol. X
1999] SCREENING OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 269
presented by a genetically engineered microbial product applica-
tion, it is not clear if the EPA itself even has the capacity to do
this properly. The EPA could begin to address these problems of
risk decision-making in the regulation of bioagriculture by simply
publishing a standard guideline of risk assessment for genetically
engineered microbial product screening.

